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Abstract 
The root cause of most accidents in the process industry has been attributed to process safety issues ranging from 
poor safety culture, lack of communication, asset integrity issues, lack of management leadership and human 
factors. These accidents could have been prevented with adequate implementation of a robust process safety 
management (PSM) system. Therefore, the aim of this research is to develop a comparative framework which could 
aid in selecting an appropriate and suitable PSM system for specific industry sectors within the process industry. A 
total of 21 PSM systems are selected for this study and their theoretical frameworks, industry of application and 
deficiencies are explored. Next, a comparative framework is developed using eleven key factors that are applicable 
to the process industry such as framework and room for continuous improvement, design specification, industry 
adaptability and applicability, human factors, scope of application, usability in complex systems, safety culture, 
primary or secondary mode of application, regulatory enforcement, competency level, as well as inductive or 
deductive approach. After conducting the comparative analysis using these factors, the Integrated Process Safety 
Management System (IPSMS) model seems to be the most robust PSM system as it addressed almost every key area 
regarding process safety. However, inferences drawn from study findings suggest that there is still no one-size-fits-
all PSM system for all sectors of the process industry. 
Keywords: Process Safety Management (PSM); Accidents; Process Industry; Comparative analysis 
1.0 Introduction 
The continuous increase in worldwide energy demand has seen proliferating rates in the 
complexity of process facilities and operations in the process industry. These industry 
advancements have led to more exposure to higher risk levels which require urgent attention. 
Research findings by the International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (IOGP) as 
illustrated in Figure 1 show that the fatal accident rate (FAR) in the oil and gas industry has 
been on the steady increase over the last three years (IOGP, 2017). Despite the average 
reduction in fatal accidents over the last decade, there has been an upsurge of FAR from 1.1 in 
2014, to 1.4 in 2015 and 1.7 in 2016. While there was reduction in fatalities from 54 in 2015 
to 50 in 2016, more fatalities were witnessed in fewer incidents in 2016. 
 
Figure 1. Number of fatalities, fatal accidents and fatal accident rates in the oil and gas industry from 2007 to 
2016 adapted from IOGP, (2017) 
There seems to be an unpredictability in the nature of accident occurrence, which reiterates 
the urgent need to address them using a preventive approach rather than reactive technique 
(Theophilus et al., 2018). Process safety is a field which is based on the prevention of 
explosions, accidental chemical releases, fires, and structural collapses in the process industry 
(AIChE, 2011). There is a huge debate regarding the distinguishing factor between process 
safety and occupational safety. However, it should be noted that occupational safety, unlike 
process safety, focuses solely on workplace hazards such as slips, trips and falls (Cheng et al., 
2013).  
There are dire consequences associated with process safety failings, most of which could lead 
to multiple fatalities, environmental damage, property loss, criminal charges, damage to 
company reputation and huge financial implications (Ismail et al., 2014). A typical example is 
the Deepwater Horizon blowout in 2010 which claimed 11 lives, spilled over 4 million barrels 
of crude oil into the Gulf of Mexico, led to death of diverse aquatic species, displaced 
businesses, tourists and indigenous inhabitants, and incurred criminal charges and financial 
implications to British Petroleum (BP) of up to $60 billion till date (Norazahar et al., 2014). 
Other case studies include the Piper Alpha disaster in 1988 which caused 167 fatalities, the 
Alexander Kielland collapse in 1980 which caused 123 fatalities and the BP Texas refinery 
explosion in 2005 which led to 15 fatalities and 180 injuries (Ismail et al., 2014). The root 
causes of these accidents have been attributed to process safety failings ranging from poor 
safety culture, lack of communication, asset integrity issues, lack of management leadership 
and human factors (Hsu et al., 2015). These could have been prevented with the adequate 
implementation of a process safety management (PSM) system across these process facilities 
(Bridges and Tew, 2010). This paper was not geared towards selecting the best PSM system 
for various industries, but it was rather aimed at developing a comparative framework which 
could aid in selecting the appropriate and suitable PSM system for specific industry sectors 
within the process industry. The key objectives of this research were to: -  
a) Select the various PSM systems that have been developed across various fields and 






























































Fatal accident rate (fatalities per 100 million hours worked)
b) Develop a framework based on different features that could be used in analysing the 
functionalities of the various PSM systems. 
c) Compare the various PSM systems based on the developed framework and map them 
according to their levels of flexibility and robustness. 
d) Recommend areas for future improvement in each of the PSM systems 
This section provided a general overview of process safety and creates a rationale for this 
study using process accident statistics. The next section outlines the characteristics of various 
PSM systems and regulations, as well as their strengths and drawbacks. Furthermore, the 
development of the framework used for comparing the various PSM systems is discussed, 
after which the systems are compared using the developed framework. Suitable inferences are 
drawn from the study and appropriate recommendations are made accordingly for the PSM 
systems and the process industry going forward. 
2.0 Overview of Process Safety Management Systems 
PSM was first introduced in 1971 by experts in the European Federation of Chemical 
Engineering, which later evolved into the creation of systems and frameworks in the 1980’s 
(EPSC, 2018). Various PSM systems have been developed over the years, with each having 
its strengths and drawbacks (Theophilus et al., 2018). The PSM systems that were selected to 
be examined in this paper were chosen based on their applicability in various sectors of the 
process industry. A summary of these PSM systems that have been selected for this study is 
presented in Table 1. This analysis shows the trend in development of PSM systems over the 
years, the theories behind their design, their framework for implementation, their industries of 








Table 1. Process safety management systems in the process industry adapted from Theophilus et al., (2018) 
Model Framework Year of 
design 




Deficiency of Model References 
Responsible Care 
 Process Safety 
Code (RCPSC) 
It is built on a simple Plan-Do-
Check-Act framework that elevates 
the standard for performance in 
industries, as well as being flexible in 
meeting needs of various companies   
1984 It was designed to 
prevent the unintended 
release of hazardous 
substances by using 
technical 
improvements 
Petrochemical • - It does not consider several 
human factors 
• - There is no road-map for 
implementation of the 
elements within its framework 
 
Howard et al. (2000) 
Lenox and Nash (2003) 
CIMAH 
regulations 
It applies a goal-setting framework to 
identify, evaluate and mitigate any 
dangerous consequences that may 
arise from industrial activities. 
1984 It was designed to curb 
the consequences of 
major accidents on 







• - No safety reports 
- Changes to safety 
management systems not 
addressed 






API RP 750 It is organized similarly to the OSHA 
and CCPS framework such that it 
embodies 11 elements and 
implements them using the PDCA 
framework 
1990 It was designed as the 
first framework for 
managing process 
hazards in the oil and 
gas industry 
Oil and Gas 
Petrochemical 
Refining 
• - It did not set out indicators 
for measuring process safety 
performance 





US OSHA PSM 
Program 
It is a performance-based framework 
hinged on management commitment 
which increases the workforce 
influence in managing process safety 
1992 It was designed to 
mitigate the accidental 





• - It has remained unchanged 
and has few human factor 




Safety Case Its regulatory framework was made 
to meet the recommendations in the 
Lord Cullen’s report after the Piper 
Alpha disaster. 
1992 It requires companies 
in offshore installations 
to produce a safety 
document to show that 
there is an efficient 
safety management 
system in place 
Offshore • - It focuses only on paper 
safety and not real safety in 
practice. 
• - They are compliance-driven 
• - They reduce the level to 
which risks are being 
considered within 
organizations as they feel they 










It is built on the ISO 14001 standard, 
as well as the Responsible Care 
1992 It was designed to 
improve personnel, 
Petroleum • - It is quite complex to be 
understood by people that are 
ExxonMobil (2017a) 
ExxonMobil (2017b) 
initiative to manage health, security, 
safety and environmental risks 
health, security and 
process safety 
performance  
not part of the company 
• - It does not certify employee 




It is built on a similar framework 
with the OSHA PSM program 
1993 It was designed to 
prevent major 










• - It does not incorporate key 
human factors like safety 
culture into its framework 
• - It does not focus on 
performance measurement 
and management review 
CAPP (2014) 
ILO (2017) 
API RP 75 It is also organized similarly to the 
OSHA and CCPS framework such 
that it embodies 11 elements and 
implements them using the PDCA 
framework 
1993 It was developed as a 
safety and 
environmental program 
for offshore operations 
and facilities 
Oil and gas • - It does not incorporate 





EPA RMP Its framework is centered around 
hazard assessment, a prevention 
program and an emergency response 
program which must be included in 
the RMP to be submitted to the EPA 
1994 It was designed to 
monitor companies 
involved in the use of 
regulated toxic or 
flammable substances 




• - Human factors are not 
adequately addressed 
• No certified method of 
implementation 
US EPA (2013) 
Ufner and Igleheart 
(2017) 
US EPA (2017a) 
US EPA (2017b) 
COMAH 
regulations 
Its framework is extended from the 
CIMAH regulations and is designed 
to meet the requirements of the 
Seveso II Directive 
1999 It allows competent 
authorities to assess the 
safety of designated 




• - Cost of compliance 
• - Public information may 
affect commercial 
confidentiality and site 
security 
• - Consent for hazardous 
substances 
• - Different attitudes to 
implementing the Seveso II 











Risk-Based Process Safety (RBPS) 
Framework builds the ideas of the 
earlier CCPS model to organize the 
2007 It was designed after 
the Bhopal tragedy in 




• - It does not address all human 
factors. 
• - There is no road-map for 
Pitblado (2011) 
Rigas and Sklavounos 
(2004) 
Model management system principles of the 
Plan-Do-Check-Act in order to be 
used across various organizations 
results with less funds 
and as a benchmark for 
the industry 
implementation of the 
elements within its framework 
Frank (2007) 
BP OMS Its framework integrates BP’s 
requirements on operational 
reliability, social responsibility, 
environment, security, safety and 
health into a common management 
system 
2007 It was designed after 
the Deepwater Horizon 
blowout to ensure 
compliance of BP’s 
industry standards with 
legislative 
requirements 
Oil and gas • - It does not incorporate all 
safety management system 
elements in it framework 
BP (2014) 
Dumon (2014) 
Whitford et al. (2011) 
 
SEMS Regulation Its framework is a performance-
focused tool for managing and 
integrating offshore activities based 
on the API RP 75 third edition in 
2004. 
2010 It was enacted to make 
mandatory the API RP 
75 rule in order to 
enhance environmental 
protection and safety of 




• - It does not fully incorporate 








Its framework is built with the 
Reason’s Swiss Cheese model as a 
template, however, using the Health 
and Safety Management System 
developed by ILO and OSHA as a 
benchmark for its implementation 
2010 It was designed to 
provide a basic and 
organized approach for 
small and large 




• - Human factors are not fully 
integrated into the framework 
• - There is no adequate route 
map for implementation 
Hooi et al. (2014) 
Murray (2015) 





Its framework is built on high levels 
safety culture, with management 
commitment and operational 
discipline by workforce being the 
central point of focus in successful 
implementation of its plan 
2010 It was initially 
designed to ensure 
safety of their facilities, 
but later was used as 
benchmark for other 








• - Its basic wheel-like structure 
shows no line of action or 
implementation of elements 
within its framework 
Kalthoff (2005) 
Fernández-Muñiz et al. 
(2007) 
Hart and Milstein (2003) 
CSChE PSM 
Guide 4th edition 
It was built on a similar framework 
with the 1989 AICHE/CCPS 
Technical Management of Chemical 
Process Safety. 
2012 It was created as a 
more efficient 
framework for the 
prevention of accidents 
Chemical • -It does not consider 
involvement of the workforce 
and stakeholders 
• -It does not also take into 
CAPP (2014) 
Amyotte (2011) 
in the Canadian 
chemical industries 
account the manner in which 
operations are conducted. 
IOGP/IPIECA 
OMS Framework 
The framework uses a Plan-Do-
Check-Act approach to address 
security, process safety, quality, 
environment and social responsibility 
risks. 
2014 It was designed to 
improve the 
development and 




Oil and Gas • - It does not fully address 
human factors within its 
framework 
• - It totally relies on human 
compliance and does not 







The PSM system is developed based 
on Process Safety Information (PSI) 
element of PSM 29 CFR 1910.119 
(d) 
2014 It was designed as an 
OSHA PSM 




information in pilot 
plant. 
Chemical • - The PSM system focuses 
solely on process safety 
information which is one of 
many elements in a PSM 
system 




This PSM system was developed 
based on OSHA PSM 29 CFR 
1910.119 (h) 
2015 It was designed to 
provide a structured 
and easy technique to 







• - The PSM system focuses 
solely on contractor 
management which is one of 
many elements in a PSM 
system 





The framework was created based on 
OSHA CFR 1910.119 (n) and a 
model was developed to reflect this 
framework 
2016 It was designed to 
provide a structured 
and easy technique for 
organisations to plan 
and implement 
emergency planning 




• - This PSM model is solely 
based on emergency planning 
and response, which is one of 
many elements in a PSM 
system 
Abdul Majid et al., (2016) 
IPSMS model The Integrated Process Safety 
Management System (IPSMS) model 
2017 It was designed as a 
robust and holistic 
Oil and Gas • - This model was only 
validated using literature, 
Theophilus et al. (2018) 
was designed using the PDCA 
framework, while its implementation 
strategy adopted the DuPont tripartite 
operational discipline model of three 
main aspects: personnel, technology 
and facilities 
alternative to the 
previous PSM models 
by integrating their 
elements into one PSM 
system and including 
the human factors 
missing from them 
without any input from 
industry professionals 
• - It failed to consider factors 
such as impact of climate 
change on oil and gas 
operations in its design 
 
2.1 Process safety functional pillars 
Process safety is fundamentally built on functional pillars (CAPP, 2014; ISC, 2018). The 
Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP) proposed four functional pillars and 
had previously compared the elements of only four processes safety management systems 
(PS-MS) using these four functional pillars listed below (CAPP, 2014, p. 18).  
 
Pillar 1: Commit to Process Safety 
Pillar 2: Understand Hazards and Risk 
Pillar 3: Manage Risk 
Pillar 4: Learn from Experience 
 
Similarly, the Energy Institute proposed four functional pillars which closely match those 
proposed by CAPP and are depicted in the Figure 2 (Energy Institute, 2016). Both the CAPP 
and the Energy Institute identified leadership commitment to be top and the need to learn 
from experience (review and improvement) as key to processes that must follow all risk 
control management processes. 
 
 
Figure 2. Four functional pillars proposed by the Energy Institute (Energy Institute, 2016) 
 
However, IChemE Safety Centre (ISC) proposed six functional pillars depicted in the Figure 
3 (ISC, 2018). These pillars identify that effective management of process safety requires 
leadership commitment as central to process safety management in an organisation. It also 
reflects on the four pillars proposed by CAPP and Energy Institute. However, these six pillars 
created some overlap and was also acknowledged by the ISC For instance, safety culture 







Figure 3. Six functional pillars proposed by the IChemE Safety Centre (ISC, 2018) 
                           
While the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP) had previously compared 
the elements of only four processes safety management systems (PS-MS) (CAPP, 2014, p. 18) 
using the four pillars listed above, this paper will compare the elements of all the known PS-
MS (seventeen in total) using the same four functional pillars.  
 
2.2 Key Elements of a Process Safety Management System  
Regulators and process industry managers alike are recognising that there are key process safety 
elements that must be part of any process safety management system (PS-MS) and must address 
process safety functional pillars. As illustrated in Figure 4, the ISC prosed seven process safety 
functional pillars as: 1) Process Safety Leadership (PSL); 2) Knowledge and Competence (KC); 
3) Engineering and Design (ED) 4) Systems and Procedures (SP); 5) Learn from Experience 
(LE); 6) Human Factors (HF) and 7) Safety Culture (SC). Therefore, any process safety 
management system (PS-MS) elements should address these key functional pillars. For example, 
there is an increased acknowledgement that “strong Process Safety Leadership is vital, because it 
drives the “safety culture” of an organisation, and safety culture in turn influences employees’ 
behaviour and participation in safety. Similar to occupational safety, tasks may also be delegated 
in process safety. However, the responsibility and accountability to ensure that safety will always 
remain with the leadership of the organisation (IChemE, 2015). Therefore, Process Safety 




Figure 4. Six functional pillars of process safety (IChemE, 2015) 
 
2.2.1 Essential Elements of Corporate Governance for Process Safety 
 
According to OECD, (2017), there are five categories which represent the essential elements of 
corporate governance for process safety. These are illustrated in Figure 5 using a process of risk 
awareness, information, competence and action; while leadership and culture form the central 
focus. Leadership and culture create an open environment for process safety (Frank, 2007). CEO 
and leaders ought to provide policy on corporate governance for process safety which describes 
the management expectations, required commitment, and corporate activities in relation to 
process safety (Webb, 2008). With regards to risk awareness, there should be a clear 
understanding of vulnerabilities and risks (Hendershot et al., 2011). It is also essential that 
management has knowledge of the importance of process safety throughout life cycle, identifies 
various layers of protection within process systems, ensures consistent management systems, 
assesses risks of budget reductions on process safety, and takes responsibility for emergency 
planning (OECD, 2017). Similarly, CEO and leaders ought to ensure that process safety 
programmes are driven by essential data that proactively seek out information relating to process 
safety (audits, performance indicators, inherent hazards and risks, dangerous trends, effective 
control of risks, contractor management, etc). Also, management should ensure that process 
safety programmes are robust enough to guarantee organisational competence to manage the 
hazards of its operations (Elangovan et al., 2005). Process safety programmes ensure that 
organisational leaders engage in articulating and driving active monitoring and plans. 
                
 
Figure 5. Essential elements of corporate governance for process safety (OECD, 2017). 
 
2.2.2 Essential features of a process safety management system 
Every PSM system has various features that aid the implementation of process safety in an 
organisation. The robustness of a PSM system is hugely dependent on the elements contained 
within its framework and the existence of a clear implementation strategy for each of these 
elements. Theophilus et al., (2018) developed an integrated process safety management 
system (IPSMS) model which was geared towards addressing human factors that were 
missing from existing PSM systems. This IPSMS model was developed by pooling elements 
across various PSM systems to develop its theoretical framework. As illustrated in Table 2, 
every essential feature of a PSM system that was present in any PSM system was highlighted 
using a tick mark, while those that were absent were left blank. The table shows that the 
IPSMS model contains all essential elements of a PSM system. However, this is because it 
integrated elements from all existing PSM systems; thereby improving on the weaknesses of 












Table 2. Essential features of a process safety management system 
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1. Management commitment, responsibility and accountability to process safety √   √ √ √ √ √ √  √ √ √ √ √ √   √ √ 
2. Compliance with legal and industry standards √   √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √   √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
3. Worker consultation √  √ √     √ √ √   √    √  √ 
4. Objectives, targets and safety programs    √ √ √ √ √      √  √    √ 
5. Employee, contractor and supplier selection and management √ √ √ √   √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √  √ √ √  √ 
6. Stakeholder involvement √   √   √ √    √ √ √   √  √ √ 
7. Process hazard analysis √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
8. Health evaluation and fitness for duty    √            √    √ 
9. Document and record control, and process knowledge management √  √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √    √ √ 
10. Operating manuals and procedures √ √ √ √  √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √   √ √ √ 
11. Process safety information √ √ √ √  √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √  √   √ √ √ 
12. Standards and safe work practices √ √  √  √   √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
13. Management of change √ √ √ √  √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √   √  √ 
14. Operational readiness and pre-startup reviews √ √ √ √  √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √  √ 
15. Emergency planning and response √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √   √ √ √ √ √ 
16. Inspection and maintenance √   √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √  √  √ √ √ 
17. Performance and quality assurance  √  √  √   √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √  √ √ √ 
18. Asset integrity and management of safety critical devices √ √ √ √  √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
19. Operational control, permit to work and risk management √  √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
20. Communication amongst workers    √ √  √ √      √      √ 














22. Incident reporting  √   √   √ √ √ √ √   √  √   √ √ 
23. Benchmarking    √   √ √    √ √ √  √    √ 
24. Audits √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √  √   √    √ √ √ 
25. Incident investigation √ √ √ √  √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √  √  √ √ √ 
26. Management review and intervention for continuous improvement √   √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √   √ 
3.0 Research methodology 
This research paper adopted a qualitative methodology, with primary and secondary data 
collected for qualitative data analysis. Merriam and Tisdell, (2015) highlight qualitative 
research as an inductive process where data is analysed for the purpose of formulating 
hypothesis. Similarly, Creswell, (2013) suggests that qualitative research helps in 
investigating and providing solutions to gaps in knowledge in several disciplines. Although, 
Flick, (2009) opines that this method is time-consuming and less accurate with cognitive 
interpretations to study findings. However, the argument of Creswell et al., (2007) that 
qualitative research deals with richer information and provides deeper insight into the 
phenomenon being studied makes it a preferred method of choice for this study. Hence, this 
research adopted the qualitative approach as the preferred method of choice to develop a 
comparative framework for process safety management systems in the process industry.  
3.1 Population Sample and Data Collection Method 
3.1.1 Collection of documentary data 
The study utilised documentary data which contained relevant information about process 
safety management systems. These documentary data were sourced from peer-reviewed 
literature in academic databases such as Science Direct, Scopus, Research Gate, Wiley Online 
Library and Google Scholar. found peer-reviewed journals to be very reliable sources of 
information for academic research. Process safety data were also sourced from websites of 
reputable organisations such as Institution of Chemical Engineers (IChemE), UK HSE, 
OECD, DuPont, Energy Institute American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) and 
Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP). The Zotero research assistant was 
used to collate all documentary data used for analysis in this study and also served as the 
primary reference tool for this research. After searching each of these databases, a total of 21 
PSM systems were selected for comparison in this study. 
3.1.2 Collection of interview data 
Qualitative interviews were conducted to understand the perception of process safety experts 
regarding the comparative framework for PSM systems in the process industry. The 
interviews helped in buttressing and validating the documentary data collected from academic 
literature. A total of 9 process safety experts were contacted to participate in the interview; 
however, only 4 of them responded and agreed to be part of the study. The interviewees were 
selected using simple random sampling based on their job affiliation and level of experience 
in the process industry. The interview participants included two Process Engineers and two 
Process Safety Management Lecturers. The interviewees were engaged through telephone 
calls and face-to-face meetings. Upon seeking permission of each interview participant, the 
location and time of the interview were scheduled. Each interview lasted for about 15 to 20 
minutes and some probing questions were asked after specific questions to gain more detailed 
information about the comparative framework being developed. Interviews were recorded and 
later transcribed to ensure that every conversation was appropriately documented. 
3.2 Qualitative Data Analysis 
3.2.1 Documentary analysis 
After analysing documentary data from journal papers and company websites, the factors that 
were selected for the comparative framework of PSM systems include: - 
• Framework and room for continuous improvement: - Every PSM system is 
required to have continuous improvement strategies which could help organisations 
cope better with management of change (AIChE, 2014). Ideally, after conducting risk 
assessments or incident investigations, some flaws may be identified within an 
organisation’s PSM system that need to be addressed (AlKazimi, 2015). Therefore, 
framework and room for continuous improvement was selected as a key factor for the 
comparative framework. All PSM systems which had continuous improvement 
strategies in their framework were marked as “Yes”, while those without one were 
marked as “No”. 
• Design specification: - IChemE Safety Centre (ISC) prosed seven process safety 
functional pillars as: 1) Process safety leadership (PSL); 2) Knowledge and 
competence (KC); 3) Engineering and design (ED) 4) Systems and procedures (SP); 5) 
Learn from experience (LE); 6) Human factors (HF) and 7) Safety culture (SC) (ISC, 
2018). The Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP) proposed four 
functional pillars and had previously compared the elements of only four processes 
safety management systems (PS-MS) using these four functional pillars including: 
Commit to process safety, understand hazards and risk, manage risk and learn from 
experience (CAPP, 2014, p. 18). Similarly, the Energy Institute proposed four 
functional pillars which closely match those proposed by CAPP comprising of: 
Process safety leadership, Risk identification and assessment, Risk management, as 
well as review and improvement (Energy Institute, 2016).  Also, OECD, (2017) 
highlights five categories which represent the essential elements of corporate 
governance for process safety including: risk awareness, information, competence and 
action, as well as leadership and culture. The design specification of the IPSMS model 
by Theophilus et al., (2018) was developed by incorporating all 26 essential features 
of existing process safety management systems as seen in Table 2. Therefore, this 
study included design specification into its comparative framework to account for 
essential features of PSM systems. Since the PSM systems have a total of 26 elements 
in their framework collectively, each PSM system was given a score out of 26 to 
account for the essential elements of a PSM system contained in their framework. 
• Industry adaptability and applicability: - Industry adaptability and applicability 
were selected as one of the comparative criteria as the process industry comprises of 
various sectors. It is imperative that any PSM system which is developed for the 
process industry should at least be applicable across a number of sectors within the 
process industry (McGuinness and Utne, 2014). The various PSM systems were 
assessed from a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 denoting low industry adaptability and 5 
representing a very high industry adaptability. This means that PSM systems that are 
used within just one sector are given a score of 1 while those applicable to multiple 
sectors have scores increasing up to 5, depending on the number of sectors they could 
be used in. 
• Human factors: - Human factors were also selected as key factors that could be 
paramount in ascertaining the robustness of PSM systems, since the safety and 
integrity of activities that take place in the process industry are functions of the 
interaction among man, equipment and process (Rodríguez and Díaz, 2016). In this 
regard, the PSM elements were evaluated using the Human Factors Analysis and 
Classification System (HFACS) by (Shappell and Wiegmann, 2013). The HFACS 
system comprises of 19 human factors which were all juxtaposed with the various 
PSM systems to see which of the systems addressed key human factor categories. Any 
PSM element that addressed all 19 human factor components sufficiently was allotted 
a score of 19, and corresponding scores were given to any PSM system depending on 
the number of human factors they adequately addressed. 
• Scope of application: - The scope of application was another factor that was taken 
into consideration, with Theophilus et al., (2016) suggesting that PSM systems could 
be affected based on the hierarchical level within the organisation which it applies to. 
These various levels ranged from 1 for employees and staff, 2 for line managers and 
supervisors, 3 for senior management of company and organisation, 4 for safety 
regulators and 5 for national and international agencies and institutions. Depending on 
the level of hierarchy that a PSM system was applicable to, they were designated a 
range of scores. For example, a PSM system that was applicable from personnel to 
national and international agencies was given a range of 1-5, implying that its scope of 
application was extensive. 
• Usability in complex systems: - The usability of the PSM systems in very complex 
systems was also taken into context. The process industry is made up of several 
complex systems and the levels of complexity within these systems have tremendously 
increased over the years, which goes to suggest that PSM systems ought to also evolve 
to cater for these complexities that could pose new hazards (Qureshi, 2008). Ideally, 
PSM systems should accommodate tier 1 (greater consequence) and tier 2 (lesser 
consequence) process incidents (AIChE, 2011). The scores allotted to each PSM 
system under this category were either “Yes” for those that can be used in complex 
systems and “No” for those that cannot.  
• Safety culture: - It is satisfactory for every organisation in the process industry to 
have a PSM system in place. However, it is also vital to note that safety culture is 
pivotal in ensuring the success of any of these systems (Shirali et al., 2016). Without a 
good safety culture in any organisation, all safety policies, procedures and measures 
could be in serious jeopardy (Morrow et al., 2014). Consequently, safety culture was 
added as one of the criteria for examining the PSM systems and it was also designated 
using the “Yes” or “No” classification. 
• Primary or secondary mode of application: - Some PSM systems are designed to be 
applied as stand-alone components of a PSM system, while others require the 
incorporation of one or more PSM systems to function successfully (Moore et al., 
2015). Consequently, the PSM systems were grouped in this category under P for 
primary and S for secondary systems, with primary systems being those that can 
function alone while secondary systems require integration with other PSM systems to 
be successfully implemented. Some systems which could function solely, and could 
also be integrated with other systems were assigned as PS. 
• Regulatory framework and enforcement: - Similar to the analogy of safety culture 
being pivotal in ensuring the success of PSM implementation, it is noteworthy to 
include regulatory enforcements as prerequisites in PSM systems as national and 
international agencies, as well as regulatory bodies could better execute PSM elements 
to the latter (Kwon et al., 2016). A typical example is the Safety Case Regulations 
which places an onus on all operators of offshore oil and gas facilities to produce a 
safety case document to ensure that they have mitigated all possible hazards as far as 
reasonably practicable (UKHSE, 2006). This is key in not just ensuring that there is a 
safety policy but goes as far as confirming that every requirement in the policy is met. 
Hence, PSM systems that did not place emphasis on regulatory enforcement were 
designated as “No, while those which did were marked “Yes”. 
• Competence level: - The various ways and methods through which PSM systems can 
be applied are most times detailed in their implementation strategy. This provides the 
end-users which could be staff, regulators, government or even the general public on 
how they could implement this system. However, a major factor to be considered is 
the level of competence (knowledge, ability, training and experience) required to 
implement a PSM system in any organisation (Dekra, 2017). Most PSM systems may 
require advanced competence in order to be applied, while some require basic 
competence. Depending on the level of competence required to use any of these 
systems, “A” was assigned to those systems that needed advanced competence level to 
gain knowledge of their application, while “B” was allotted to those which needed 
basic competence to use. 
• Inductive or deductive approach: - Finally, the principle of operation for each PSM 
system was considered. PSM systems were analysed for how they execute the various 
elements provided within their framework. PSM systems adopt either an inductive or a 
deductive approach in their method of application. Inductive PSM systems stipulate 
various key areas, elements, factors and measures that should be present within an 
organisation to ensure safety, while the deductive systems verify the levels of 
functionality, compliance and adequacy of the measures being suggested (Sklet, 
2004). Any system found to be inductive was marked as “I” while those that were 
deductive were marked as “D”. The systems that applied both inductive and deductive 
approaches were marked as “ID”. 
3.2.2 Content analysis of interview responses 
The interview data for this study was analysed using content analysis due to its ability to identify 
paragraphs, themes and keywords in an interview. Content analysis involves the process of 
identifying perceptions, collecting samples of these perceptions and analysing them in order to 
find any correlations (Elo et al., 2014). The analysis of interview data highlighted some notable 
factors which are to be considered when comparing PSM systems. The interview questions were 
structured to first seek expert opinion about the factors which should be included in the 
comparative framework, before suggesting some other factors obtained from literature. In this 
section, key findings from the transcribed interview responses are extracted, trimmed and 
presented as quotes. 
 
Process safety experts were first quizzed about the factors that they believed were important 
when comparing process safety management (PSM) systems. Their responses are presented 
below: - 
 
‘…I believe that an ideal process safety management system should be compared based on 
their ability to prevent loss of containment. They should have elements that specifically tackle 
risks associated with fires, explosion, collapses, and structural damage.’ – Process Engineer, 
oil and gas company in Aberdeen 
‘…Well, I think any system for process safety should be able to manage process hazards and 
risks. Things like facility or equipment damage, operational procedures, and regulatory 
compliance are important factors to be considered.’ – Process Engineer, chemical 
manufacturing plant in Nigeria 
‘…It is one thing to have a process safety management system, but it is another thing for that 
system to be easily understood and implemented in industry. I would say factors such as 
complexity of the system, the various features contained within the management system, and 
adequate knowledge and training for the implementation are all vital.’ – Process Safety 
Management Lecturer, United Kingdom 
‘…The factors in question will depend on the particular industry within the process sector 
because each industry comes with its own unique risks’ – Process Safety Management 
Lecturer, United Kingdom 
Afterwards, interviewees were probed further using the comparative factors obtained from 
literature. After listing all 11 factors used for the comparative framework, participants were 
asked if there were any other factors that were missing from the framework. Their responses 
were thus: - 
‘…The factors you just mentioned are good enough to compare process safety systems’ – 
Process Engineer, oil and gas company in Aberdeen 
‘…Not exactly. I believe these are well detailed’ – Process Engineer, chemical manufacturing 
plant in Nigeria 
‘…Like I said earlier, training is important. So, it is good that competence has been added 
because it covers training, knowledge, experience and ability’ – Process Safety Management 
Lecturer, United Kingdom 
‘…PSM system should be compared depending on the industry which is using them. So yes, I 
believe industry adaptability and applicability are important factors to consider’ – Process 
Safety Management Lecturer, United Kingdom 
Participants were also asked whether they believed that PSM systems should be flexible in their 
scope of application and the criteria which flexibility of PSM systems should be based on. They 
responded by saying: - 
‘…To say a process system is flexible, they should be applied across any industry and in any 
situation that arises’ – Process Engineer, oil and gas company in Aberdeen 
‘…For flexibility, I will say anyone with limited knowledge or experience should be able to use 
it’ – Process Engineer, chemical manufacturing plant in Nigeria 
‘…Such a PSM system should be able to cater for any kind of process safety risks before you 
can deem it to be flexible’ – Process Safety Management Lecturer, United Kingdom 
‘…This means that the PSM system can be applied in any situation and in various ways’ – 
Process Safety Management Lecturer, United Kingdom 
Lastly, participants were also asked whether they believed that PSM systems should be 
compared based on their levels of robustness and the criteria which robustness of PSM systems 
should be based on. Their responses were: -  
 
‘…That has to do more with the amount of process risks that are addressed by the 
management system’ – Process Engineer, oil and gas company in Aberdeen 
‘…A process system is robust if it can manage if it addresses all the comparative factors listed 
here’ – Process Engineer, chemical manufacturing plant in Nigeria 
‘…A robust process safety management system must not be lacking any essential features of a 
standard process safety management system – Process Safety Management Lecturer, United 
Kingdom 
‘…Again, I think this might depend on the industry of application because what might be 
robust for one industry might not be the same for another’ – Process Safety Management 
Lecturer, United Kingdom 
 
The last two questions on flexibility and robustness of PSM systems were used to compare PSM 
systems in the study using a quadrant matrix similar to the study of Hollnagel and Speziali, 
(2008). In their study, accident investigation tools were compared according to their levels of 
coupling and tractability. As seen in Figure 6, this quadrant matrix helped in understanding the 
accident investigation tools that were either loosely coupled and tractable, tightly coupled and 
tractable, loosely coupled and intractable, as well as tightly coupled and intractable. Similarly, in 
this study, the quadrant matrix was used to show PSM systems that were flexible and robust, 




Figure 6. Quadrant matrix used to classify accident investigation tools (Hollnagel and Speziali, 2008) 
 
4.0 Comparison of PSM Systems using Developed Framework 
 
Table 3. Comparative Framework of PSM systems and regulations in the process industry 
   Criteria for  
















































































































































































































































 Process Safety 
Code (RCPSC) 
Yes 12/26 1 15 1-3 Yes Yes S No B I 
CIMAH 
regulations 
Yes 19/26 5 9 1-5 Yes No S Yes A D 
API RP 750 Yes 22/26 3 9 1-3 Yes No S No B I 
US OSHA PSM 
Program 
No 14/26 5 9 1-5 Yes Yes PS Yes A ID 
Safety Case Yes 21/26 1 9 1-5 Yes No S Yes A D 
ExxonMobil 
OIMS 
Yes 19/26 1 9 1-3 Yes Yes P No A ID 
ILO PSM 
Framework 
No 17/26 5 13 1-5 Yes Yes P Yes A ID 
API RP 75 Yes 22/26 1 10 1-3 Yes No S No B I 
EPA RMP No 17/26 1 9 1-5 Yes No S Yes A ID 
COMAH 
regulations 





Yes 26/26 5 13 1-4 Yes Yes PS Yes A ID 
BP OMS Yes 22/26 1 9 1-3 Yes Yes P No A ID 









No 13/26 5 9 1-3 Yes Yes PS Yes A ID 
CSChE PSM 
Guide 4th edition 
Yes 19/26 1 9 1-4 Yes Yes P No A ID 
IOGP/IPIECA 
OMS Framework 
Yes 23/26 1 13 1-3 Yes Yes P Yes A ID 
PSI4MS Yes 13/26 1 9 1-4 Yes Yes PS Yes B ID 
CoMS Yes 18/26 5 13 1-4 Yes Yes PS Yes B ID 
EPR model Yes 11/26 5 9 1-4 Yes Yes PS Yes B ID 
IPSMS Model Yes 26/26 5 19 1-5 Yes Yes PS No B ID 
As seen in Table 3, all PSM systems have framework and room for continuous improvement, 
with the exception of the US OSHA PSM Program, ILO PSM framework, EPA RMP, DuPont 
ORM model. The PSM systems with the highest level of industry adaptability “5” within the 
process industry include: CIMAH regulations, US OSHA PSM program, ILO PSM 
framework, COMAH regulations, Energy Institute High-Level PSM framework, DuPont 
ORM model, CoMS, EPR model and IPSMS model. Most of these PSM systems can be 
widely applied in the chemical, oil and gas, petrochemical and other major hazardous 
installations across the process industry. Based on the HFACS framework, the PSM systems 
that addressed at least 10 out of 19 human factors in the framework include the RCPSC, ILO 
PSM framework, API RP 75, COMAH regulations, AICHE/CCPS RBPS model, SEMS 
regulation, Energy Institute High-level PSM framework, IOGP/IPIECA OMS framework, 
CoMS and the IPSMS model. For the scope of application, the number of PSM systems that 
are applicable from national and international agencies down to the personnel include: 
CIMAH regulations, US OSHA PSM program, Safety Case, ILO PSM framework, EPA 
RMP, COMAH regulations, SEMS regulation and IPSMS model. Considering the complex 
nature of operations in various sectors of the process industry, it is evident that all current 
PSM systems can be applied in complex sociotechnical systems. However, some of these 
PSM systems as highlighted by other comparative factors may not be robust enough to 
adequately address key concerns in the process industry. The PSM systems that considered 
safety culture in their framework include RCPSC, US OSHA PSM program, ExxonMobil 
OIMS, ILO PSM framework, AIChE/CCPS RBPS model, BP OMS, Energy Institute High-
Level PSM framework, DuPont ORM model, CSChE PSM Guide 4th edition, IOGP/IPIECA 
OMS framework, PSI4MS, CoMS, EPR model and IPSMS model. Some PSM systems could 
also be easily incorporated with other PSM systems during process safety implementation 
such as US OSHA PSM program, AIChE/CCPS RBPS model, DuPont ORM model, PSI4MS, 
CoMS, EPR model and IPSMS model. There are certain PSM systems that also ensure 
regulatory enforcement if not adhered to such as CIMAH regulations, US OSHA PSM 
program, Safety case, ILO PSM framework, EPA RMP, COMAH regulations, AIChE/CCPS 
RBPS model, SEMS regulation, Energy Institute High-Level PSM framework, DuPont ORM 
model and IOGP/IPIECA OMS framework. With regards to training needs for the various 
PSM systems, there are few that require basic competence for employees in implementing 
them such as RCPSC, API RP 750, API RP 75, PSI4MS, CoMS, EPR model and IPSMS. The 
other PSM systems are quite complex in implementation and could be cumbersome to 
implement without adequate and intensive training. The RCPSC, API RP 750 and API RP 75 
adopt an inductive approach in their implementation strategy while CIMAH regulations, 
Safety case, COMAH regulation and SEMS regulation adopt a deductive approach. Other 
PSM systems adopt a mixed approach of inductive and deductive methods in implementing 
their PSM strategy. 
4.1 Flexibility and robustness of PSM systems 
According to findings from the comparative framework, it is pertinent to group these PSM 
systems according to their levels of flexibility and robustness. This could ease the decision of 
companies who wish to adopt a PSM system by providing them a summary of all PSM 
systems in the process industry at first glance (Lee et al., 2016). As illustrated in Figure 7, this 
categorisation of PSM systems was done in a matrix structure similar to the study of 
(Hollnagel and Speziali, 2008). Flexibility of PSM systems was decided based on 3 factors 
including industry adaptability, competence level and inductive/deductive approach; while 
robustness was decided based on all 11 comparative factors shown in Table 3. Therefore, the 
matrix was calibrated using a scale of 3 for flexibility and 9 for robustness. Firstly, any PSM 
with a high score in industry adaptability was deemed to be flexible and robust in its 
application, while those with low scores had less flexibility and robustness ratings. PSM 
systems with high scores under human factors were also classified as robust systems as they 
could address multiple flaws emanating from various accident causal factors. Also, PSM 
systems whose scope of application spanned from national agencies “5” to personnel “1” were 
also grouped as robust PSM systems. Since all PSM systems in the process industry are 
applicable to complex systems, they were all deemed to be robust in this regard. Similarly, 
PSM systems that included safety culture in their framework were considered to be robust. 
Some PSM systems can be used as primary standalone systems and also secondarily in 
conjunction with other PSM systems. Such PSM systems which had both primary and 
secondary applications were also believed to be robust since they can be used in almost every 
scenario (Energy Institute, 2016). It is one thing to have a PSM system and another thing to 
ensure that it is enforced (Moore et al., 2015). Without enforcement of these PSM systems, 
they could just be bureaucratic formalities which will not be adhered to by employees 
(Pitblado, 2011). Therefore, for a PSM system to be robust, it must also have regulatory 
enforcement at the heart of its implementation. The more robust a PSM system is, the more 
advanced the training needs for it will be (Fernández-Muñiz et al., 2007). Hence, PSM 
systems with advanced training needs were classified as robust. However, this could hamper 
their level of flexibility as they might not be flexible to be applied by novices in the process 
industry. Likewise, PSM systems which applied inductive and deductive approaches in their 
implementation strategy were thought to be flexible and robust. 
As illustrated in Figure 7, the IPSMS model seems to be the most flexible and robust of all the 
PSM systems in this study. This is possibly because the IPSMS model was developed by 
incorporating the elements from all other PSM systems to form its theoretical framework; 
hence, making it a robust coalition of PSM systems for the process industry (Theophilus et al., 
2018). One factor it was lacking, however, was the lack of regulatory enforcement offered by 
its implementation strategy. A possible reason for this could be because this model has not 
been adequately validated and tested in the process industry. Therefore, more research needs 
to be carried out to validate and test the IPSMS model in various sectors of the process 
industry. Other PSM systems that also showed high levels of flexibility and robustness 
include the AICHE/CCPS RBPS model, ILO PSM framework, US OSHA PSM program, 
DuPont ORM model and Energy Institute PSM framework. However, PSM systems such as 
the IOGP/IPIECA framework, COMAH regulations, SEMS regulation, CIMAH regulations, 
and EPA RMP are less flexible in terms of competency but more flexible in terms of industry 
adaptability. The API RP 750, API RP 75, BP OMS, Safety case and ExxonMobil OIMS are 
all highly specialised PSM systems restricted to use within the oil and gas industry; hence the 
reason for their low level of flexibility in industry adaptability. The PSI4MS, CoMS and EPR 
model have moderate levels of flexibility and robustness, possibly because they are highly 
specialised PSM systems solely for process safety information, contractor management, and 
emergency planning and response respectively. Evidence from these findings suggest that 
there is still more research to be done in terms of enhancing the flexibility and robustness of 
PSM systems in the process industry. 
Figure 7. Quadrant matrix showing the flexibility and robustness of PSM systems in the process industry 
5.0 Conclusion 
This research was aimed at conducting a comparative analysis of PSM systems in the process 
industry. The study involved the development of a comparative framework to aid in the 
selection of appropriate PSM systems for specific industry sectors within the process industry. 
A total of 21 PSM systems were selected for this study and their theoretical frameworks, 
industry of application and deficiencies were all explored. This comparative framework was 
designed using 11 key factors which were applicable to the process industry including: 
industry adaptability, human factors, scope of application, use in complex systems, safety 
culture, primary or secondary mode of application, regulatory enforcement, training 
requirement, as well as inductive or deductive approach. After conducting the comparative 
analysis using these factors, the Integrated Process Safety Management System (IPSMS) 
model was deemed to be the most robust PSM system as it addressed almost every key area 
regarding process safety. However, the IPSMS model has not yet been tested or validated by 
any organisation within the process industry and this poses to be a major flaw of the system. 
A major inference drawn from this research is that there is no one-size-fits-all PSM system for 
all sectors of the process industry. Instead, process industry sectors should be extensive and 
thorough when selecting the right PSM system that will be most suited to the scope of their 
operations. 
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